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 As I’m writing this, Christians are bru-
tally murdering Muslims in the Central 
African Republic; people in Syria are being 
bombed, starved, and tortured; and homo-
sexuals still face the death penalty in Iran 
as well as long prison sentences in countries 
like Uganda and Nigeria and persecution 
by thugs in many countries. These atroci-
ties and many other disturbing phenomena 
are often called “human rights violations.” 
What gives them this status? That is a ques-
tion about which there has been a surpris-
ing amount of disagreement among political 
philosophers. 
 Not so long ago, the question “What are 
human rights?” would most likely have been 
answered with a simple definition. Something 
like “Human rights are the rights that we 
have simply by virtue of being human.” The 
phrase “simply by virtue of being human” 
may be harder to unpack than it seems at 
first, but one of the commonly held ideas 
was that the possession of human rights is 
not dependent on any convention or insti-
tution. Human rights, in other words, are 
moral rights. This doesn’t prevent them from 
becoming enshrined in treatises and conven-
tions or from receiving protection through 
legal mechanisms, but legally protected 
human rights are also moral rights—rights 
which we would have had even if these pro-
tections didn’t exist. 
 This point seems intuitively so obvious 
that it is hard to see how anyone could deny 
it. Slavery violates a human right, not just 
because some UN body agreed on a document 
that says that slavery violates a human right. 
Surely those who were enslaved before the 
second half of the twentieth century had their 
human rights violated as well. Not everyone, 
however, has shared this intuition. Some have 
thought that it is at least awkward, perhaps 
even downright incoherent to think of human 
rights as somehow “existing” independent of 
the declarations that affirm them, or inde-
pendently of any legal framework which 
brings them into existence (I take it that this is 
the point of Bentham’s famous denouncement 
of human rights as “nonsense upon stilts”). 
 The idea that human rights are essentially 
connected to institutions has recently taken 
a different form. Under the influence of John 
Rawls, several philosophers have developed 
what are now called “political theories of 
human rights.” A prominent feature of several 
of these theories is the suggestion that human 
rights are misconceived if taken as an ethical 
doctrine rather than part of a distinctly polit-
ical morality. Since this position has become 
influential, I shall first discuss two prominent 
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versions of this account. The relative merit 
of political theories versus alternatives will 
ultimately depend—among other things—on 
how they accommodate our most firmly held 
beliefs about the topic. Beitz, in particular, 
has argued that his theory provides a better 
fit with human rights doctrine and practice 
than traditional approaches to human rights. 
If he is right, we should indeed abandon the 
traditional approach to human rights and 
adopt some version of the political theory. 
As we shall see, however, the case in favor 
of political theories is at least overstated 
and the case for abandoning the traditional 
approach to theorizing human rights perhaps 
misguided. More positively, I shall suggest 
another approach—what I call a “descriptive 
approach”—that promises to do better on 
most of the criteria put forward to evaluate 
theories of human rights. 
 POLITICAL THEORIES OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
 One of the most controversial elements in 
Rawls’s theory of international relations is 
the truncated list of human rights. Rawls 
mentions rights to the means of subsistence 
(but not to health care or education); to 
freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced 
occupation, and to a sufficient (but not nec-
essarily equal) measure of liberty of con-
science; to personal property; and to formal 
equality as expressed by the rules of natural 
justice (i.e. that similar cases be treated simi-
larly) (Rawls, 1999, 65). Many commenta-
tors have found Rawls’s list of human rights 
objectionably illiberal. Such crucial rights 
as freedom of expression and association, 
as well as the right to democratic participa-
tion are missing from the list. Buchanan has 
remarked that according to Rawls’s account, 
to prevent women or members of a particu-
lar racial or ethnic minority from getting 
an education, from voting, or from holding 
public office would not count as a violation 
of their human rights (Buchanan, 2010, 21). 
Rawls’s motivation seems to have been to 
avoid charges of parochialism. He remarked 
that human rights “as thus understood, can-
not be rejected as peculiarly liberal or special 
to the Western tradition” (Rawls, 1999, 65). 
This raises two questions: First, why should 
we refrain from affirming “peculiarly lib-
eral” human rights? Rawls does not seem 
to think much needs to be said in defense of 
the need for a “non-parochial” list of human 
rights. He simply states that if all societies 
were required to be liberal “then the idea of 
political liberalism would fail to express due 
toleration for other acceptable ways . . . of 
ordering society” (59). He presents a hypo-
thetical example of a regime, Kazanistan, 
which—though it is not perfectly just—
seems to Rawls decent because it protects 
this limited number of human rights (and 
is not expansionist and has a consultation 
hierarchy) and then appeals to the reader’s 
intuition to agree with his judgment (76–78). 
There is little else by way of an argument. 
The other question is how Rawls arrives at 
his peculiar list of human rights. It would not 
be possible (nor does Rawls intend) to argue 
for this selection from actual agreement: even 
if such agreement were to exist, it would not 
carry the normative weight necessary to jus-
tify a list of human rights. He seems to think 
that the list can be justified by employing the 
idea of a system of social cooperation. When 
these rights are regularly violated, he writes, 
“we have command by force, a slave system, 
and no cooperation of any kind” (68). Again, 
however, this is merely stated, not argued. It 
is not clear why, say, a state that used public 
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resources to support a hereditary elite in lux-
ury and keeps everyone else at the level of 
subsistence (Buchanan, 2010, 21) would 
count as a system of social cooperation, even 
if this state had a decent consultation hierar-
chy, or why personal property is a prerequi-
site for social cooperation. 
 Human rights perform a specific func-
tion in Rawls’s theory: their violation can 
justify military intervention by foreign pow-
ers (Tasioulas, 2009). He does recognize a 
broader set of rights—which he calls liberal 
constitutional rights—that are genuinely pos-
sessed by all, but are not properly human 
rights because their violation does not give 
rise to a (defeasible) reason for the interna-
tional community to forcefully intervene 
in a society. This is highly revisionist: while 
humanitarian intervention is increasingly 
accepted in international law, justifying it is 
by no means the only, or even the main, func-
tion of human rights. Liberal and decent soci-
eties, says Rawls, have the right not to tolerate 
outlaw states, and they have a duty of assist-
ing burdened societies (i.e. societies which are 
unable to become well-ordered on their own). 
The duty of assistance must—within the con-
tractarian framework of the law of peoples—
be derived from the self-interest of liberal and 
decent societies (Steinhoff, 2012). Similarly, 
we might think that the specific list of human 
rights could somehow be derived from the 
interest of well-ordered societies, perhaps in 
creating an international environment free 
from instability. However, even if we can 
readily think of situations where intervention 
to protect human rights serves the interest 
of other states in international stability and 
peace, it again remains completely unclear 
how this interest would ground the specific 
list favored by Rawls. 
 Some of this may explain why Rawls’s spe-
cific treatment of human rights has not been 
particularly influential. His general approach 
to the topic, however, has received consider-
able following. Charles Beitz, for example, 
presents what he calls a “practical approach” 
to human rights that is inspired by Rawls. 
He suggests that “human rights” is an emer-
gent political practice, rather than a norma-
tive idea (Beitz, 2009, xii). Consequently, 
talk about human rights being possessed by 
humans “simply in virtue of their humanity” 
is at best a confusing way of indicating that 
they apply to all human beings—confusing 
because it falsely suggests that these rights 
have some existence independently of the 
practice. His approach shares two crucial 
features with Rawls’s account. One is that 
human rights have a distinctly political role. 
According to Beitz, human rights apply in 
the first instance to the political institutions 
of states, but they may become a matter of 
international concern when governments fail 
to carry out their duties. When they do so, 
human rights have an interference-justifying 
role. This role is central to understanding the 
discursive functions of human rights, Beitz 
maintains, even if it does not exhaust the 
range of measures for which human rights 
violations might provide reasons. The second 
feature that this account shares with Rawls’s 
is that it denies that we can adequately theo-
rize human rights through ordinary moral 
reasoning. Since human rights is a prac-
tice, we can only understand the concept of 
human rights by analyzing what is inherent 
in it. If successful, the analysis would rep-
resent a consensus among competent par-
ticipants in the practice, but not necessarily 
a consensus about the practice’s normative 
contents. Beitz uses the Rawsian distinction 
between concept and conception to clarify 
this thought. Different people who have 
different conceptions of human rights may 
nevertheless share the same concept, because 
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they could agree on the role of human rights 
in practical reasoning about the conduct of 
global political life (99). 
 There is something strangely odd about 
this account. While it seems very empirically 
oriented, it is also clearly revisionist. The 
problem is not with the claim that past theo-
ries of human rights have misdescribed some-
thing essential. It is rather with the thought 
that the authors of these theories could have 
been mistaken about the very fact that they 
were discussing a normative idea. To this, 
Beitz might respond that these authors could 
well have been discussing a normative idea, 
but that they were mistaken in identifying 
this normative idea with the idea (or practice) 
of human rights. Such a response, however, 
is inconsistent with linguistic practice, even 
with the language used in UN declarations 
and conventions. More importantly, how-
ever, it would only turn the disagreement into 
a terminological quibble that could be easily 
resolved by distinguishing—as, for exam-
ple, Wellman (2011) does—between “moral 
human rights” and “international human 
rights.” Beitz, of course, would resist the con-
clusion that a mere terminological decision 
could resolve the issue, since he thinks that 
conceiving human rights as natural rights has 
contributed much of the distortion in philo-
sophical understandings of human rights. 
 MORAL RIGHTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
 How should we conceive the relation 
between moral human rights and interna-
tional human rights—meaning the existing 
global legal-institutional phenomenon of 
human rights? (Buchanan, 2010). At one end 
of a spectrum, one could think that these are 
separate phenomena. Moral human rights 
(HR) are the subject of traditional, naturalist, 
theories of human rights, while international 
human rights (IHR) are the preoccupation of 
political theories of human rights. But this is 
obviously unsatisfactory. If moral theorizing 
strives to be relevant to our actual going-
about in the world, as it certainly should, 
then theories of moral human rights should 
have the ambition to bear on actual attempts 
to legally protect human rights, and hence 
on IHR. For example, a theory of HR may 
find that some human rights are not yet 
protected by international institutions, even 
though they ought to be. Or it might con-
clude that many of the supposed human 
rights enshrined in international declarations 
and conventions are not real (moral) human 
rights. This may or may not be a problem. It 
could be a problem, for example, if the pro-
motion of otherwise worthwhile social goals 
under the guise of human rights damages the 
sense of urgency that is properly attached to 
a claim that a human right is not sufficiently 
protected or has been violated. 
 If it is implausible or undesirable to think 
of moral human rights as entirely independ-
ent of IHR, it would be equally misguided to 
shift to the other end of the spectrum. That 
is, it would be equally wrong to think that 
the rights protected by IHR can only be justi-
fied if for each legal human right there is a 
corresponding moral human right. The inter-
national system of human rights treatises and 
conventions may serve several goals. One of 
those goals should obviously be to further 
the protection of moral human rights, but 
another possible goal served by IHR could 
be to promote peace. Preventing war is of 
course also likely to decrease the violation of 
moral human rights, but the mere avoidance 
of human suffering may be an independent 
and sufficient ground for promoting peace 
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through international human rights legisla-
tion. Again, IHR may have as one of its aims 
to further social justice and in the pursuit of 
that aim some of its agents could well prom-
ulgate rights that are not moral human rights. 
Clearly, the mere fact that some of the rights 
incorporated in IHR are not moral human 
rights is not in itself sufficient ground to con-
clude that the inclusion of those rights in IHR 
is illegitimate. Nor does this stance imply that 
theories of moral human rights have no prac-
tical consequences. If we found, for example, 
that the introduction of certain legal rights 
in IHR in pursuit of otherwise worthy goals 
would undermine the system’s effectiveness in 
protecting genuine moral human rights, this 
would raise serious questions regarding the 
desirability of these legal rights. The protec-
tion of moral human rights may not always 
take priority over the pursuit of other goals, 
but it certainly does in many cases. 
 It seems that we have reason to value IHR, 
whether or not we find that it is best seen as 
nothing more than a straightforward attempt 
to enforce moral human rights. Hence, even 
a significant divergence of HR from IHR 
would not automatically justify a demand to 
reform the latter. In fact, any theory of moral 
human rights would bear a significant bur-
den of justification if it recommended dras-
tic changes in IHR. None of this, however, 
warrants the dismissal of normative theories 
of HR as irrelevant or misguided when they 
aspire to provide a yardstick for the assess-
ment of IHR. The language of the UDHR 
and of the most important other conventions 
shows that the drafters of these documents 
thought of human rights as preexisting moral 
rights. If moral philosophers have been mis-
taken in thinking that moral human rights 
are relevant, they are surely in good com-
pany. But if the majority of current partici-
pants in the practice of IHR share the idea 
that the strong moral force attached to many 
or most of the rights acknowledged by IHR 
is due to the fact that they are (also) preexist-
ing moral rights, as I think they do, then the 
illumination of HR is not just a luxury but 
quite simply an essential element of a proper 
assessment of IHR. 
 CONSTRAINTS ON THEORIES 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 How should we evaluate a theory of human 
rights? A helpful starting point is Allen 
Buchanan’s list of desiderata:
 1.  Consonance. A theory of HR should be 
consonant with our most stable intuitions 
on the topic. 
 2.  Reasonable fi t. It should fi t reasonably 
with the doctrine and practice of human 
rights. 
 3.  Constraint. It should curb human rights 
infl ation. 
 4.  Content. It should help us determine the 
content of various human rights. 
 5.  Guidance. It should help us resolve con-
fl icts among human rights. 
 6.  Non-parochialism. It should include a 
response to the parochialism objection. 
 Anyone who agrees with the suggestion 
that moral human rights is a distinct idea 
that deserves to be taken seriously because of 
the influence it (still) has on the practice of 
human rights will also agree that desideratum 
#1 should take priority over desideratum #2. 
However, I shall suggest that even the natural 
rights theories that perform best on this cri-
terion (say, those of Gewirth, 1978, Griffin, 
2008) fail the desideratum of consonance in 
important respects. The main reason for this 
is that our intuitions regarding human rights 
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are the historical offspring of two very dif-
ferent (traditions of) natural rights theories: 
theories of property rights (in a very broad 
sense) and theories of welfare rights (in a 
very broad sense). So even if we find that 
no particular natural rights theory satisfies 
desideratum #1, it doesn’t rule out the pos-
sibility that different natural rights theories 
 together satisfy the criterion. However, since 
these theories are incompatible in their prac-
tical consequences, the only way we could 
regard them as satisfying the criterion of 
consonance together is to abandon the per-
spective of normative theorizing. As long as 
we are merely trying to find out  what human 
rights are, that is no objection. I shall point 
out later that this way of asking the question 
what human rights are will affect the desider-
ata and hence what we expect from a theory 
of human rights rather dramatically. 
 FIVE CHALLENGES AGAINST 
NATURALISTIC THEORIES 
 Theories of HR can be (and have been) chal-
lenged on most of these criteria. Four of the 
most significant challenges have to do with 
scopes (#1 and #3), the political nature of 
human rights (#2), the distribution of cor-
relative duties (#4), and the relation between 
human rights and their justification (#6). 
 1. At the most general level, the issue of 
scope is about whether any naturalist theory 
of HR is able to give a satisfactory answer to 
the question which rights we have. But there 
is a problem. Anyone’s view on whether a par-
ticular theory  has given a satisfactory answer 
to the question which rights we have obvi-
ously depends on one’s view of what counts 
as a satisfactory answer. Take, for example, 
contemporary libertarian natural rights 
theories. Libertarians typically deny that we 
have any innate moral right to such things as 
basic health care or elementary education. For 
some political theorists, this in itself serves to 
show that the libertarian is not talking about 
(international) human rights. The libertarian, 
however, is unlikely to be impressed by this, 
for she is unlikely to share the political theo-
rist’s view of the relation between HR and 
IHR. Most libertarians would condemn the 
practice of levying tax on citizens in order 
to finance a system of universal health care 
or education as a violation of the property 
rights of the wealthy. This is not even a case 
of a conflict of rights—the rights of property 
owners on the one hand and the rights of 
the needy on the other—since the libertarian 
denies that the needy have moral rights to 
such provisions. To the extent that IHR stim-
ulates states to finances systems of universal 
health care through taxation, the libertarian 
will view it as complicit in the large-scale vio-
lation of the human rights of property own-
ers rather than attempting to protect human 
rights. If the political theorist wants to insist 
that the libertarian is talking about natural 
rights rather than human rights, she may 
well do so but it will seem little more than 
a word game to the libertarian. After all, the 
crucial function of libertarian natural rights 
is to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate 
uses of government force, which is also the 
most important function of human rights for 
the political theorist. So while the political 
theorist may think that the libertarian has 
not even addressed human rights, the liber-
tarian will obviously disagree. 
 The criterion of consonance as applied 
to scope is also likely to leave us begging 
the question when intuitions differ. Given 
that most right-libertarian theories do not 
acknowledge such rights as health care and 
education, most of us may find that these 
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theories are not consonant with “our” most 
stable intuitions on the topic. This doesn’t 
seem to bother most libertarians, and it is 
not immediately clear that it should. Instead, 
they may well scorn the suggestion that the 
truth about human rights should depend on 
the intuitions of even a majority of people. 
Unfortunately, the role of intuitions in dis-
covering ethical truth raises problems far too 
complex to be pursued here. 
 What if we take for granted that most of 
us (non-libertarians) agree sufficiently on 
the scope of human rights for there to be a 
benchmark to compare theories of human 
rights with? Let us further assume that this 
 quasi -consensus is fairly close to the list of 
human rights endorsed by the most impor-
tant human rights treaties and conventions. 
Would this give us a reason to discard natu-
ralist theories of human rights because the 
list of rights they generate is simply too short 
to be recognizable as a list of human rights? 
It would if all naturalist theories were of the 
libertarian variety. But that is not the case: 
philosophers like Gewirth and Griffin have 
built theories that imply much more exten-
sive sets of human rights. So the complaint 
about the limited normative reach of natu-
ralistic theories rests on a disregard for the 
considerable variety in this group of theories. 
The problem of scope takes on a different 
form for several of these theories, though, 
because it is unclear whether they are able to 
prevent rights inflation (#3; see later). 
 2. What reason might we have to think 
that human rights are in the first instance 
rights against states? Philosophers are used 
to thinking of some rights as moral entities. 
In daily life, however, we think of ourselves 
as exercising rights primarily in legal/politi-
cal contexts. The main idea that comes to 
mind when we think of a right to protest is 
a duty of the government not to persecute 
protesters. When we talk about rights that 
we have against other people, we usually 
have legal rights in mind. Most of us would 
not ordinarily speak of yourself as having a 
right against your friend that she goes to the 
movies with you because she promised to 
do so. I gather that even philosophers who 
are prone to talk about promises generat-
ing rights would not use the word “right” 
in ordinary life when describing the situa-
tion created by a promise. Compared to this, 
it is perhaps a remarkable feat about our 
linguistic intuitions that talk about prom-
ises generating rights doesn’t come across 
as awkward at all. Because the notion of a 
right of a promise doesn’t strike us as a cat-
egory mistake, the divergence in philosophi-
cal work from ordinary linguistic practice is 
not normally considered a ground for reject-
ing theories that construe promises as gen-
erating rights. This is important because the 
idea that human rights are distinctly political 
rather than moral could be seen as receiving 
support from linguistic practice in a similar 
manner. We are more likely to use phrases 
like “human rights violations” when con-
fronted with large-scale violence and oppres-
sion committed by government agents against 
civilians, especially because these incidents 
are also far more prevalent than, say, simi-
lar violence committed by rogue militia. Still, 
since the label “human rights violations” does 
not induce a conceptual shock when applied, 
for example, to the atrocities committed by 
nongovernmental militia in Syria, we should 
resist the temptation to take linguistic prac-
tice as sufficient basis for theoretical claims 
about human rights. 
 Another argument brought forward by 
proponents of political theories of human 
rights is that some human rights presuppose 
the existence of modern states. Such rights 
as the right to asylum, or to a nationality are 
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not even conceivable outside the framework 
of modern nation-states. Does this show that 
human rights are specifically modern, and 
hence that they cannot possibly be rights 
imagined by natural rights theorists which 
human beings could have even in a state of 
nature. There is a simple answer to this objec-
tion. Such rights as the right to asylum are 
derived from more fundamental rights which 
do not presuppose the existence of a state 
system (see, e.g. Wellman, 2011, 41–70). One 
of the main grounds for granting refugees 
asylum is that they risk persecution. It is thus 
easy to see that the right not to be persecuted 
is more fundamental than the right to asy-
lum. Even more fundamental than the right 
to asylum is the right to physical integrity. 
This right surely could conceivably exist in 
a world that has no modern system of sover-
eign states (but see Beitz, 2009, 55). 
 3. The first complaint against natural 
rights theories was that their scope is much 
more restricted than that of contemporary 
human rights practice. As we saw, this may 
be true of some naturalistic theories, but is 
certainly not true of all of them. For some of 
these theories, the opposite may well be true. 
That is, they fail to constrain the prolifera-
tion of human rights. Consider, for example, 
Griffin’s recent defense of rights based on 
personhood. “Human rights,” Griffin writes, 
“can be seen as protections of our human 
standing, or, . . . personhood” (Griffin, 2008, 
33). To be a person or agent in the fullest 
sense of which we are capable, we need three 
things: autonomy (being able to choose one’s 
own path through life), minimal provision (so 
that we are able to act upon one’s choices), 
and liberty (others not forcibly stopping us 
from pursuing what we see as a worthwhile 
life) (33). Griffin also tells us that human 
rights “are rights not to anything that pro-
motes human good or flourishing, but merely 
to what is needed for human status” (34). 
This suggests a very minimalist interpreta-
tion of the requirements of human rights. 
Most of us will grow up to be autonomous 
beings even without a formal education. 
People living in severe poverty are normally 
able to act, even if they may not be able to 
derive much satisfaction from their life or 
achieve many of their goals. Again, people 
who are imprisoned may be prevented from 
pursuing many of their projects, but not nec-
essarily to such an extent as to be deprived of 
their personhood. Thus it seems that the set 
of human rights generated by Griffin’s theory 
must be exceedingly small—so small as to be 
hardly recognizable as a list of human rights. 
In fact, the criterion of personhood may not 
even prohibit most forms of torture. 
 Griffin realizes that a strict interpreta-
tion of the agency criterion doesn’t pro-
duce a plausible list of human rights, but he 
denies that this is the conception at the core 
of his theory. Instead, he claims to have in 
mind a “somewhat ampler picture” of some-
one autonomous “who, within limits, is not 
blocked from pursuing his or her conception 
of a worthwhile life” (34). The crucial ques-
tion is where to draw the line. For exam-
ple: we are told that education is necessary 
because it is a condition for effective agency, 
but that there are levels of education beyond 
what is required by human rights (53). 
Since education is almost never needed for a 
human being to become an agent, and since 
Griffin insists that we do not have a right to 
education sufficient for human flourishing, 
the theory should be able to tell us something 
about the amount of education necessary for 
“effective” agency. Griffin, unfortunately, 
tells us nothing of the kind, and he is equally 
silent regarding the level protection required 
by minimal provision. These problems are not 
specific to Griffin’s theory. Other versions of 
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the theory that aims to ground rights in per-
sonhood (like those of Gewirth or Plant) suf-
fer the exact same weaknesses. They start out 
with the idea that human rights only require 
that we have the things that allow us to be 
agents, but—realizing that this is insufficient 
for a plausible theory of human rights—con-
tinue that we should have the means for the 
effective exercise of our agency. Of course, 
no theory could be plausible if it required 
that we should have the means for any or 
all of our actions to be effective. The prob-
lem is that these theories lack the theoretical 
resource to nonarbitrarily limit the amount 
of support that human rights require. Griffin 
appeals to “practicalities” to plug the gap, 
but he doesn’t provide much insight as to 
how these are supposed to work (Van Duffel, 
2013). Thus the best contemporary natural 
rights theories fail to provide a convincing 
cure for the proliferation of rights. 
 The proliferation of human rights and the 
inability of natural rights theories to stop 
that proliferation may be a serious cause for 
concern, but it is not a reason to embrace 
political theories of human rights. The phe-
nomenon of human rights proliferation that 
disturbs many is internal to the IHR practice. 
Some political theories may rule out certain 
candidates as incompatible with the idea of 
human rights as it is inherent in IHR, but 
these theories have as yet not given us a cred-
ible instrument to constrain the proliferation 
of human rights. 
 4. Many of the rights that we have are 
correlative to duties of other people. Some 
of these duties—so-called negative duties, 
like the duty not to kill—can be fulfilled 
simply by abstaining from certain actions. 
Some rights, however, are correlative to posi-
tive duties, which require others to actually 
provide a good or a service. A human right 
to subsistence is only meaningful if there is 
someone who has a duty to provide neces-
sities when they are lacking. The problem is 
that most people also believe that you can 
have a duty something only when you are 
able to do it. If a train is about to crash into 
a crowd and kill dozens of people, I certainly 
have a duty to stop it if I can, but it doesn’t 
make sense to say that I have such a duty if I 
am unable to fulfill it. A significant difference 
between negative duties and positive duties, 
however, is that it is always possible for eve-
ryone to abstain from murdering someone, 
but we may often be unable to provide food 
or education or health care for everyone in 
need. If we can only have a duty when we 
are able to fulfill it, then we cannot have a 
duty to provide health care for everyone, and 
if we don’t have this duty then there can be 
no human right to health care. Some have 
hence concluded that the idea of social and 
economic human rights is incoherent (see 
Cranston, 1967). 
 This criticism has given rise to an extensive 
literature, much of which has been devoted 
to defending such human right as the right 
to subsistence, to education, to health care. 
Some have questioned the practical import 
of the distinction between negative and posi-
tive rights, claiming that protecting a right 
to bodily integrity requires that governments 
maintain a police force and a judicial system. 
Others have pointed out that positive rights 
only require that we support institutions 
that provide for the needy. Yet others have 
maintained that human rights only require 
that we do what is in our power to provide 
the things that people have a right to. A 
fourth suggestion is to restrict the use of the 
phrase “human right” to legally enforceable 
claims. I have argued elsewhere (Van Duffel, 
2013) that none of these responses are sat-
isfactory, and so we are left with a problem. 
Our intuitions regarding moral human rights 
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seem incoherent because these rights demand 
more of us than we might at times be able 
to provide. As far as I can see, this problem 
is not solved by political theories of human 
rights. The fact that they allocate primary 
duties to states which are generally better 
able to respond to standard threats than indi-
viduals is not sufficient to render the idea of 
positive human rights coherent. 
 5. No matter how dominant the language 
of human rights has become in the public 
arena, doubts regarding the universality (or, 
better, non-parochialism) of human rights 
have never entirely disappeared. Indeed, one 
of the prime incentives for the development 
of political theories may have been the desire 
to detach the idea of human rights from sub-
stantive commitments to the liberal tradi-
tion or to any particular normative theory. 
Christians, Muslims, and atheists, as well as 
conservatives and socialists may agree on 
most fundamental human rights even though 
they share few or no other normative beliefs. 
From a practical point of view, disagreement 
on the grounds of these rights is quite unim-
portant as long as we agree on at least the 
basic rights. Even though agreement on a 
comprehensive list of human rights in the IHR 
practice may sometimes seem hard enough to 
reach and is likely to remain precarious, it is 
certainly easier to attain than agreement on 
any substantive theory of moral rights. 
 Whether naturalist theories of human 
rights are indeed parochial is a controversial 
matter. In fact, those who assume that they 
are usually don’t find it necessary to substan-
tiate their assumption. The reason for this, 
I suspect, is that it is not at all clear what 
it means to say that a theory is parochial or 
culturally specific. Another problem is this: 
Suppose that we accept, for the sake of argu-
ment, that existing natural rights theories 
are culturally specific. Assuming that these 
theories and the cultural experience from 
which they have emerged have had a sig-
nificant influence on the development of the 
human rights movement, how do we know 
that the idea of human rights is not culturally 
specific as well? Can we just take for granted 
that discarding the theory and replacing the 
phrase “natural rights” with “human rights” 
suffices to shrug off the cultural baggage that 
came with the former? This raises another 
issue: Is it legitimate to set non-parochialism 
as a criterion for a proper concept of human 
rights? In one sense, human rights are of 
course necessarily universal: nothing is a 
human right if it is not held by all human 
beings. But if we think an idea or a theory 
can be parochial, it can hardly be satisfac-
tory to assume from the outset that nothing 
can count as an idea of human rights unless 
it is non-parochial. The demand that it must 
be non-parochial makes sense if one intends 
to build a normative theory, but it is unwar-
ranted when one is primarily interested in 
understanding the concept itself. 
 HUMAN RIGHTS AS A CULTURAL 
PHENOMENON 
 Although this overview was much too brief to 
establish any firm conclusions, the foregoing 
discussion may nevertheless motivate us to 
explore an alternative to both naturalist and 
political theories of human rights. I suggest 
that an illuminating way to study the idea 
of human rights is to probe the structure of 
our beliefs about human rights. Rather than 
asking which rights we might have, I shall 
suggest that we might profitably ask which 
rights  we think we have . Call this the descrip-
tive approach. Another way to put this is 
that we should think of the idea of human 
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rights as a cultural phenomenon. How is the 
descriptive approach different from that of 
(naturalist and political) normative theories? 
I can only briefly mention five points. 
 First, the descriptive approach is not com-
mitted to taking a position regarding the 
truth-value of normative claims. Normative 
theories of human rights strive to answer 
questions such as “Which human rights 
do we have?” “What grounds our rights?” 
and “Who has duties to provide the things 
to which we have rights?” They attempt to 
ground rights, for example, in claims about 
human nature, or claims about prerequisites 
for the legitimacy of states. The descriptive 
approach is not interested either in affirming, 
or in rejecting the truth-value of normative 
claims. It does not deny that normative ques-
tions are important in their own right, but it 
leaves these questions aside. 
 Secondly, normative theories are (or 
can be) revisionist with regards to com-
monly accepted beliefs about human rights. 
A normative theory could make a case for 
the existence of certain human rights that 
haven’t made it to any widely accepted list. 
Or it could entail that we do not really have 
a human right to some of the things that are 
widely claimed to be human rights. There 
clearly is only a limited stretch on the ability 
of normative theories to redraw the bounda-
ries of human rights. If a theory entails too 
many claims that run counter to what most 
of us are inclined to believe—for example, if 
its list of human rights is too sparse or too 
capacious—we may conclude that the theory 
doesn’t capture the idea of human rights ade-
quately. For obvious reasons, the descriptive 
approach cannot be revisionist in the same 
way as a normative theory. 
 A descriptive approach cannot take 
beliefs of individuals as basic, but must take 
as its subject a cultural tradition as a whole. 
This opens up a tangle of thorny questions, 
like: Is there a group of people whose 
beliefs on the topic are similar enough to 
allow amalgamation? But answers to such 
questions cannot be settled in advance: they 
must be the result of the description. This 
brings us to the third point, which is that 
we may treat normative theories themselves 
as a source of knowledge about the idea 
of human rights. Normative theorists are 
rarely interested in merely stating what oth-
ers think: they want to argue what human 
rights are, not what we think they are. 
However, most normative theorists have 
attempted to appeal to widely shared ideas 
about human rights, the many articles and 
books that they have written on the topic 
provide a convenient source of information 
for anyone who wants to access these ideas. 
That is not to say that the process of bas-
ing claims about what “we” believe about 
human rights on a sample of these theories 
is entirely unproblematic. 
 The fourth point will be controversial: 
normative theories of human rights not only 
provide a good source for studying human 
rights as a cultural phenomenon, but also 
provide  the best available source of its kind. 
Studying human rights as a cultural phe-
nomenon essentially is studying the practi-
cal experience which brought into being 
the tradition of human rights theories. The 
descriptive approach studies theories as theo-
retical reflections on this practical experience 
(though these theoretical reflections of course 
helped in turn to shape that experience). 
 Fifthly, the description of human rights 
theories must be historical in its scope. This is 
because the complex development of the idea 
of human rights has left us with theoretical 
problems which can only be fully untangled 
by taking into account intuitive remnants 
from past incarnations of these theories. 
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 Unfortunately I can only give the briefest 
possible outline of the story that would 
emerge if we put this approach to work. 
The experience which has brought human 
rights theories into being is that of a cul-
ture which has for some time been influ-
enced by a monotheistic religion. In such 
a religion, the basic ethical requirement is 
to obey the commands of the author of the 
universe. This has engendered a shift in ethi-
cal outlook from a virtue ethics to a law-like 
morality (Anscombe, 1958, Williams, 1985). 
A necessary component of this ethical out-
look is the idea that human beings have a 
will, and hence that all genuine actions are 
intentional actions (Dihle, 1982). Religion 
further spreads the idea that human beings 
have a role to play in God’s plan, and hence 
that certain sets of actions are morally 
necessary. 
 From this ethical outlook and its concep-
tion of the requirements of agency, two dis-
tinct (traditions of) natural rights theories 
have emerged (Tuck, 1979, Van Duffel, 2010). 
The first is a theory of rights to subsistence 
or “welfare rights” (in a very broad sense). 
It starts from the idea that people must be 
able to make decisions and act upon them. 
In the religious version, it requires people to 
maintain the conditions created by God that 
enable people to act upon His will. The secu-
lar version requires us to generate the condi-
tions that allow people to realize their goals. 
The second is a theory of “property rights” 
(again in a very broad sense). It starts from 
the idea that our acts of will have normative 
consequences for others. It secularizes the 
idea of God’s authority over his creation by 
suggesting that human beings create as well 
and that they must have a similar authority 
over their creation. 
 A full defense of this approach involves 
showing that it resolves the problems that 
plague the other approaches. I shall, again all 
too briefly, indicate how it might do this. 
 1. The account generated by the descrip-
tive approach will be consonant with our 
most stable intuitions on the topic if these 
intuitions are nontrivially shaped by the two 
traditions of natural rights theories, as indeed 
they are. One way in which it is easy to see 
the superiority of this approach is that it can 
accommodate the fact that our intuitions were 
formed by two theories which are practically 
incompatible and have generated conflicting 
sets of rights (fundamental property rights of 
pharmaceutical companies versus rights of 
patients, for example, or rights of democratic 
majorities versus rights of individuals). 
 2. An account of human rights should be 
able to accommodate both the sense in which 
these rights are conceived as interactional 
(held by all against all individuals) as well as 
the special place of governments both in IHR 
and in our intuitions regarding human rights. 
One way in which the descriptive approach 
is again superior to both naturalist and polit-
ical theories is that it can do this by showing 
that these seemingly conflicting intuitions are 
the result of the influence of two conflicting 
theories of natural rights  and the result of the 
historical development of the theory of wel-
fare rights. 
 3. The descriptive approach does not aim 
to curb human rights inflation, but rather 
aims to explain  both the phenomenon of 
human rights inflation  and the intuition that 
this inflation is deeply problematic. It does 
this by showing how inflation is the result of 
the secularization of the theory of rights to 
subsistence (for this point and the next, see 
Van Duffel, 2013). 
 4. The problem of assigning duties correla-
tive to positive rights can also be explained 
by the same account. Historically, rights to 
subsistence were negative rights, not positive 
9781847065544_ch04_Fpp_txt_prf.indd   72 10/28/2014   12:27:17 PM
73
HUMAN RIGHTS
rights. Hence the correlative duties could not 
be excessively demanding. Again the descrip-
tive approach helps us describe human rights 
without violating crucial intuitions. 
 5. The descriptive approach explains the 
persistent suspicion that the idea of human 
rights is culturally specific, but it does 
this without entailing cultural relativism. 
Although we may be indeed feel compelled to 
reconsider the soundness of current human 
rights theories, none of this implies that we 
should tolerate cruelty or persecution in the 
name of culture. 
 CONCLUSION 
 Proponents of political theories are right 
when they point out shortcomings of natu-
ralistic theories of human rights. However, 
political theories are certainly not replace-
ment for theories of moral human rights. At 
most, they might fill a hiatus in our theoriz-
ing about IHR. Although the case for the 
descriptive approach is tentative and as yet 
underdeveloped, this approach may help fur-
ther our understanding of human rights in 
the context of political philosophy. 
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